HANDOUT 9 - WEEK 11 READING

LLM Security and Prompt Injection

CIS 350: AI for Cybersecurity - Smart Defense for the Digital Business

Colorado State University - Computer Information Systems

How to use this reading (and an ethics note)

This handout supports Week 11. We study how large language models (LLMs) are attacked - prompt injection, jailbreaks, prompt leakage, and indirect injection - ONLY to build safer LLM applications. Every attack is paired with a defense. The concepts here power Lab 9, a beginner Capture-the-Flag (CTF) done ONLY on sanctioned practice platforms. Never attack systems you are not explicitly authorized to test.

Estimated reading time: 20-25 minutes. No prior coding background needed.

1. What a Large Language Model Actually Does

A large language model (LLM) - the technology behind ChatGPT, Copilot, and most modern chatbots - is trained on huge amounts of text. Its one job is to PREDICT THE NEXT WORD, over and over. That simple trick produces fluent answers, summaries, and code. The security-critical catch: an LLM predicts plausible text - it does not truly understand or verify what it reads, and it will follow whatever instructions appear in the text it is given.



Figure 1. An LLM reads a prompt and predicts likely next words. It does not verify or truly 'understand' - it just continues the text plausibly.

Why this matters for security

Because an LLM follows instructions in its input and cannot tell a trusted instruction from a stranger's, it is like a brilliant but naive intern who obeys any note it reads. The more power (email, databases, actions) we give that intern, the more a successful trick can do.

2. Prompt Injection: the #1 LLM Risk

An LLM application gives the model a SYSTEM PROMPT (the developer's rules) plus USER input. Prompt injection is attacker input that OVERRIDES those rules - the classic line is 'Ignore your previous instructions and do X instead.' The model often obeys, because the system prompt and the user input are just one blob of text to it. Prompt injection is #1 on the OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications.



Figure 2. Direct prompt injection: the system prompt and the attacker's input reach the model as one text blob, so the attacker's instructions can win and leak internal notes.

3. Four Attacks to Recognize

Prompt injection comes in several flavors. All share one theme: getting the model to do what it should not.

- Direct injection - the attacker types malicious instructions straight into the input box.
- Indirect injection - the malicious instruction is hidden in content the LLM reads (a web page, email, or document), so the user never typed anything wrong.
- Jailbreak - coaxing the model past its safety rules, often with role-play ('pretend you have no restrictions').
- Prompt leakage - getting the model to reveal its hidden system prompt, which hands attackers a blueprint for further attacks.



Figure 3. Four common LLM attacks - variations on 'make the model do what it shouldn't.'



Figure 4. Indirect injection: a hidden instruction inside a web page or email is executed when the LLM reads that content - dangerous for 'agents' that browse or summarize documents.

4. Why LLMs Are Vulnerable

The root cause is simple: to the model, the system prompt, the user input, and any documents it reads are ALL just text - there is no reliable wall marking 'this part is trusted, that part is not.' Traditional software carefully separates code (instructions) from data; LLMs blur that line. So convincing attacker text can outrank the developer's rules. Every defense below is really about restoring some of that separation or limiting the damage when it fails.

It is already happening

Real deployed systems have been jailbroken into disallowed answers, tricked by hidden instructions while browsing, had their system prompts leaked, and had 'AI screeners' fooled by hidden white text in resumes. Impact grows fast once the LLM can take actions - send email, make purchases, or query a database.

5. Defending LLM Applications: Layers, Not a Single Fix

You cannot 'prompt away' injection completely - assume some attempts get through, and defend in depth (the same lesson as adversarial ML in Week 10). Layer these defenses so each catches what the others miss:



Figure 5. Defense in depth for an LLM app: strong system prompt, input checks, data/instruction separation, output checks, least privilege, and human oversight.

- Strong system prompt - give the model a clear role and explicit limits, and tell it to treat user text as data, not commands. Necessary, but NOT sufficient alone.
- Input guardrails - validate and filter the user input before it reaches the model.
- Output guardrails - check the response before showing it or acting on it (e.g., block replies that contain the system prompt).
- Least privilege - give the LLM the fewest tools and least access it needs; this caps the BLAST RADIUS of any successful injection. OWASP calls the opposite 'excessive agency.'
- Monitoring & human oversight - log prompts, outputs, and tool calls; require human approval for high-impact actions; have an incident plan.

Guardrails are separate CHECKS around the model, not more prompt text. A naive app simply glues the system prompt and user input together - which is exactly why 'just write a better prompt' is not enough:

```
# Naive (vulnerable) vs. guardrailed (illustrative)
prompt = system + '\n\nUser: ' + user      # one blob - model can't separate parts

if input_guardrail(user):                    # 1) check the input
    reject('blocked by input guardrail')
out = llm(build_prompt(user))
if reveals_secret(out):                       # 2) check the output
    out = '[response withheld]'
```



Figure 6. A hardened LLM app: untrusted input is checked going in AND coming out, and the model can only take limited, least-privilege actions.

There is no perfect defense

LLM security is an arms race. The realistic goal: make attacks hard (layers), CONTAIN the damage (least privilege), and DETECT attempts (monitoring) - guided by the OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications and NIST's Generative AI Profile.

Key Terms

- Large language model (LLM) - a model that predicts the next word; it follows instructions in its input without understanding or verifying them.
- System prompt - the developer's hidden instructions that set the model's role and rules.
- Prompt injection - attacker input that overrides the app's instructions (OWASP LLM risk #1).
- Direct vs. indirect injection - typed straight in vs. hidden in a document the LLM reads.
- Jailbreak - bypassing the model's safety rules.
- Prompt leakage - getting the model to reveal its system prompt.
- Guardrail - an independent check on the input to (or output from) the model.
- Least privilege / excessive agency - giving an LLM only the access it needs vs. giving it too much.

Review Questions (self-check for Lab 9 and Exam 3)

- In one sentence, what does an LLM actually do - and why does that make it follow injected instructions?
- What is prompt injection, and why is it #1 on the OWASP LLM Top 10?
- Give an example each of direct injection, indirect injection, a jailbreak, and prompt leakage.
- Explain the ROOT cause of LLM injection in your own words.
- Name four layers you would use to defend an LLM app, and what each one catches.
- Why is least privilege so important for an LLM that can take actions?

Remember: AI tools are not permitted on labs, quizzes, or exams. Week 11 material - including the Lab 9 CTF - is for DEFENSE and learning only, on sanctioned platforms you are authorized to use.

References

- OWASP Top 10 for Large Language Model Applications (owasp.org).
- NIST AI 600-1 (2024): Generative AI Profile (companion to the NIST AI RMF 1.0).
- CISA/NCSC, Guidelines for Secure AI System Development, 2023.
- K. Greshake et al., 'Not what you've signed up for: compromising real-world LLM apps with indirect prompt injection,' 2023.
- S. Willison, ongoing writing on prompt injection (simonwillison.net).
- MITRE ATLAS - adversarial threat landscape for AI systems.